



THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Princeton, New Jersey

December 20, 1966

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As the United States Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency I feel an obligation to report my views on one aspect of the proposed non-proliferation treaty. These views are based not only on my present position but on twenty-five years of involvement in atomic energy affairs. They have been clarified after talks with Mr. Foster, Mr. Fisher, and others in ACDA, the Department of State, and other branches of the United States Government and with representatives of several foreign governments.

I believe it essential that a non-proliferation treaty should contain solid provisions for inspection and control, such as are incorporated in various "safeguards" systems.

There are at present several "safeguards" systems of which the two under consideration in connection with the non-proliferation treaty are those of the IAEA and EURATOM. I am disturbed by the divergent views that seem to be held about the possible roles that they might play in a non-proliferation treaty. An adequate safeguards clause is too important to be abandoned because of institutional differences among international organizations. It would be most unfortunate if provisions for international safeguards were to be omitted from the treaty because of unresolved controversy over the roles of EURATOM or IAEA in administering such a system.

The Honorable
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.

There are three criteria which a "safeguards" system should satisfy: technical effectiveness, credibility, and acceptability. I believe the system which most nearly satisfies all three criteria is that of the IAEA. It has been approved by all 99 Member nations of that organization with minor exceptions. The membership includes all the major powers except Communist China.

While the EURATOM system has been accepted by the U.S. as technically equivalent to that of the IAEA it suffers from an obvious difficulty of any regional system now in existence or which might be set up (e.g. by the Arab League). Such systems are ipso facto likely to be arrangements among close allies with many interests in common. Inevitably they have the flavor of self-inspection and therefore lack credibility. My experience in Vienna over the years leads me to predict that many countries would challenge such a system in which military allies inspect each other's nuclear programs.

The task of inspection necessary to make a non-proliferation treaty meaningful is a formidable one. Success is most likely to be achieved if the job is assigned to a single organization with world-wide membership.

The possible contribution of EURATOM to the unification of Western Europe is outside my province, although of course I heartily endorse that objective. I do know that EURATOM has many jobs to do in promoting the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy in Western Europe. Its "safeguards" function is only a small part of its reason for existence and vigor.

I believe that an enforceable non-proliferation treaty would bring advantages to the world that would dwarf any effect on either EURATOM or the IAEA. These organizations have value only as means to promote our over-all objective of a world at peace. In attempting a major step toward that objective, we should not give exaggerated weight to institutional loyalties. Neither Western Europe, nor the United States nor any other

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3

part of the world will profit by failure to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Knowing how busy you are, I have tried to make this letter short. I consider it important that I have an opportunity to discuss these questions more fully with you or Mr. Katzenbach before I leave for Vienna about the first of February.

Respectfully yours,

H. D. Smyth

cc: Chairman Seaborg
/Mr. Foster
Dr. Hornig
Mr. Sisco
Mr. Pollack

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